This article examines Israeli views of the peace process that is ongoing concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. There are a multitude of opinions and views of the peace process elicited at various points during Israel's history and by a variety of people. A popular understanding of the origins of the conflict from the Israeli point of view is that it began following the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel's occupation of the territories and consequently the peace process negotiations should stem from this.Pappe, I., 2004, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press However, there are other understandings of the conflict and therefore the solution for peace, including some Israeli academics' and peace activists' understanding that a much longer history is involved, differing from the popular narrative often recited.Slater, J., 2001, "What Went Wrong? The collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 116 (2), pp 171–199 Suggestions for how to achieve peace in the region include a two state solution where an Israeli sovereign state and a Palestinian sovereign state exist side by side, or the suggestion of a one state secular solution where power is shared by Israelis and Palestinians. Hardliners believe that Israel should maintain sovereignty over the land it currently occupies and give no concessions to Palestinians, others believe keeping up the military campaign, occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and separation from Palestinians is the only current way forward. There is also a note of despair and uncertainness as to how to proceed among some, particularly following the failure of peace summits in the 1990s and early 21st century and the second Intifada, as Kaufman et al. have stated; "there is a growing consensus that the current political leadership are not able to build a stable peace and resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people".Kaufman, E., Salem, W. & Verhoeven, J., 2006, Introduction, in Kaufman, E., Salem, W. & Verhoeven, J. (eds), Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, page 3 As Cowen says "almost everyone wants peace [but] on his or her terms" and this is the crux of the problem.Cowen, T., 2004, A road map to Middle Eastern peace – a Public Choice perspective, Public Choice, volume 118, pp 1–10, page 2
The article looks at the views demonstrated in Israel following particular attempts to create peace between Israel and Palestinian groups; such as the Oslo Accords, the Camp David 2000 summit and the Road Map for Peace. Also scrutinized are the views of key Israeli political figures and public opinions at particular points. This article intentionally only focuses on Israeli points of view and not Palestinian views (see: Palestinian views of the peace process), it is not a history of the peace process (see: Israeli–Palestinian peace process) or the conflict (see: history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict) and it specifically looks at the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and peace process and not Israel's relations more generally with the Arab world (see: Arab–Israeli conflict; history of the Arab–Israeli conflict).
Almost every Israeli prime minister has called for peace talks with moderate Arab leaders over the years.
Narratives of the conflict The understanding given to the history of events between Israelis and Palestinians has a bearing on the solutions sought for peace and how far each side is prepared to compromise to create a peace deal.
Traditional narrative What Slater terms the "traditional narrative" and Pappe calls the "common version" essentially refer to where Israelis place themselves in relation to Palestinians and the wider Arab world and in a particular version of past events. This "traditional" or "common" narrative, as the terms suggest, is both popular and well established in the mindset of many Israelis, both civilians and politicians alike and others outside of the state, particularly in the West. The narrative broadly holds that in the 1940s the Arabs were unwilling to negotiate and it was they who instructed their people to flee in 1948 creating the refugee problem that persists today. That there are a group of Palestinians who are terrorists who wish to destroy Israel and that the Palestinians are too demanding in their peace negotiations which reflects extremism within Palestinian society, and although the destruction of Israel was initially an aim of groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and remains one for some such as Hamas, just as the idea of creating an Israeli state covering the occupied territories remains an aim for some Israelis, this has largely been rejected as an aim now and the PLO officially recognised Israel in 1988.Ben-Ami, S., 2005, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: the Israeli–Arab Tragedy, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson Part of this traditional narrative is the belief that the causes of the conflict lie in the 1967 Six-Day War and consequently peace discussions should form around the discussion of territorial negotiation. Such a narrative leads to certain assumptions about what is acceptable in peace creation and influences how Israelis who hold this perception view the peace process. Slater goes as far as to say that, in his opinion, the conflict continues partly as a result of this "mythology" of Israel's situation in the Middle East and the Palestinian "other".Slater, J., 2001, "What Went Wrong? The collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 116 (2), pp 171–199, page 172
New narrative There is an alternative to this traditional narrative: a growing scholarship from Israeli academics and peace activists looking at the history of relations between Israel and Palestine has developed what has become known as a "new history". Ilan Pappe's work referenced here can be considered part of this trend. It has reassessed Israel's role in conflict creation and continuation, demonstrating an awareness of both Israeli and Palestinian roles in the process. As a result of its understanding that the conflict reaches back beyond the Six-Day War, the narrative recognises different causes for the conflict to be beyond Palestinian anti-Semitism and towards Zionism's insistence on creating a Jewish state in Palestine for example, and consequently views the peace process differently; less fearfully of Palestinian intentions and more sympathetically to Palestinian wishes.
Responses to peace attempts The response by Israeli politicians and the general public to high-profile peace attempts give an indication of how these events, and therefore the peace process, have been viewed. Although separated here these peace process events are part of an ongoing process of negotiations, changing events and opinions.
The Oslo Accords See Oslo Accords for details of the agreement.
The agreement made in Oslo in August 1993 between Israel and the PLO was seen as a great step forward by many, although views of the Accords were not homogeneous. Some hailed Rabin's concession to consider the option of Palestinian self-rule as a welcome move towards peace and away from his hardliner background, others, both within rightwing Israeli politics and sections of society saw it as too great a concession on Israel's behalf. This view is demonstrated by the assassination of Rabin in 1995 by a rightwing radical Yigal Amir who opposed his signing the Oslo Accords and served to highlight the differences in opinion held within Israeli society as to the direction the peace process and consequently Israel should take.Yakan, M.Z., 1997, "From War to Peace: Obstacles, Prospects, and Implications of the Middle East Peace Process", in Karsh, E. (ed), From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's Troubled Agenda, London, Frank Cass and Co Ltd Suspicion of the reason for Palestinian agreement was held by a few who maintained the view that Palestinians wanted to destroy the state of Israel and that they would not attempt to keep the peace. The continued and increased attacks by some sectors of Palestinian society did nothing to aid the view that the Palestinians would not keep their side of the deal.
Israeli commentators lay blame for the failure of the Oslo Accords at Yasser Arafat's door believing his leadership to be corrupt and dictatorial rather than looking at events of Israel's making. The Oslo Accords, like previous talks had avoided key issues and the view of peace put forward by Israeli negotiators remained based on the notion of limited sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank without resolving the right to return of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 conflict avoided the longer-term view of the causes of the conflict. The issue of Israeli settlements was not concluded, and the extensive building that took place following the Oslo Accords was cited as evidence that the views of Rabin and Israelis in power who did not act in the "spirit of Oslo".Slater, J., 2001, "What Went Wrong? The collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 116 (2), pp 171–199, page 177 The issue of settlements throws up the particular and fairly extreme view of the religious-right in Israel at the time that believed negotiating over territory and the possibility of Palestinian self-rule in the religiously symbolic territories undermined what it meant to be Israeli.Jones, C., 1997, "Ideo-Theology: Discourse and Dissonance in the State if Israel", in Karsh, E. (ed), From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's Troubled Agenda, London, Frank Cass and Co Ltd Settlers also viewed the peace process at this point as a threat due to the possibility that their homes and livelihoods would be at risk. The initial building of settlements and the continuation of such schemes, despite the Oslo Accords rhetoric demonstrates that those at the top of Israeli politics did not seriously envisage creating a viable Palestinian state as part of the peace process. For citizens outside the nationalist right the period around the Oslo Accords represented a time when negotiation over territory became acceptable on the understanding that the alternative was the probability that Israel would have to lose either its liberal democracy or Zionist identity.Barnett. M., 1999, "Culture, Society and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo", European Journal of International Relations, Volume 5 (1), pp 5–36
Camp David 2000 Summit See Camp David 2000 Summit for detail of the summit.
The Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 involving United States President Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, was an attempt to agree a deal to finalise issues that would create a peace settlement. Its outcome however was a deadlock and a rejection by Arafat of Barak's offer which offered most of Arafat's demands, withholding only the demand for sole Arab control over the temple mount, the demand for complete repatriation of millions of Arabs into Israel proper, and about 30% of the contested territory. According to Ben-Ami the left in Israel believed Barak and his team had not offered enough to the Palestinians to make it a viable option, and the right believed too many concessions were offered and that the failure of the peace process was what they had expected. A conflict of views on the peace process was clearly evident within Israel due mainly to traditional views on the character of Israel as a Jewish state, and a newfound desperation among some for peace at any cost.