The amendment of 1986 was a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Greece to limit the powers of the president of the Republic. Eleven articles were amended, primarily targeting the responsibilities of the president of the Republic, transposing the text of the Constitution into demotic Greek, and the removal of the secret ballot for the presidential elections. These amendments transformed the liberal democracy of Greece—based on the constitution of 1975—into a populist democracy with a majoritarian parliamentary system and a prime minister acting as a "parliamentary autocrat."
The proposal was a political gamble by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who suddenly withdrew his backing for President Konstantinos Karamanlis's second term and instead promoted his own choice, Christos Sartzetakis. At the same time, Papandreou announced a constitutional revision to remove the powers of the president that acted as checks and balances against an already dominant office of the prime minister.
Despite the political and constitutional crisis that emerged from the unconstitutional procedures in electing Sartzetakis, as later court rulings concluded, the revised Constitution of 1975/1986 was accepted by all political powers after the polarized 1985 Greek parliamentary election.
Background
First stage
On 6 March 1985, the centre-right New Democracy party announced that it would support Konstantinos Karamanlis's second term as president, while on the same day, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) declared that it would put forward its candidate. The press anticipated that Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou would also support Karamanlis, since he had assured Karamanlis of his support in person. However, on 9 March, at the meeting of the Central Committee of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Papandreou sided with the left wing of the party, which instead backed Supreme Court justice Christos Sartzetakis. Sartzetakis, known for his handling of the 1963 murder of left-wing deputy Grigoris Lambrakis, was viewed favorably by the left. The announcement occurred at the Central Committee of PASOK on 9 March.
The move surprised some of Papandreou's ministers, much of his party's rank-and-file, and Sartzetakis himself, who was not consulted in advance. Journalist Robert McDonald reported that Papandreou claimed that the choice was done without Sartzetakis's knowledge to present his decision as spontaneous, however, Sartzetakis knew in advance in addition to the two senior judicial figures who had refused the nomination. At the same time, Papandreou announced plans for constitutional reform, which rekindled debate on the type of republic Greece should be and damaged the existing consensus between PASOK and New Democracy that had existed since 1981.
Papandreou also argued that it would be illogical for Karamanlis to preside over any constitutional reform since much of the 1974 constitution was influenced by Karamanlis. Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of creating a constitutional crisis in order to remove Karamanlis from office and establish a totalitarian constitution. Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, , as he could not bring himself to do so in person. In response, Karamanlis resigned from the presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the termination of his term, and was replaced by PASOK's speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ioannis Alevras, who served as constitution of 1974.
Parliamentary votes for president & colored ballots
The presidential vote was conducted by the Hellenic Parliament in a tense and confrontational atmosphere due to constitutionally questionable procedures by Papandreou. Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating the constitutional principle of secret ballot (Article 32) by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots. However, Mitsotakis' concern was dismissed because PASOK controlled the majority in the Parliament. Despite vigorous protests from the opposition, PASOK members used colored ballots under strict surveillance to spot potential defectors. Sartzetakis received 180 votes, which was the minimum stipulated by the constitution, and Alevras, as president of the Hellenic Parliament, cast the decisive vote. Mitsotakis deemed the vote illegal and threatened to remove Sartzetakis from the presidency if they won the upcoming elections, intensifying the constitutional crisis.
Constitutional proposals & debate In contrast with the constitutional violations raised during Sartzetakis' election, PASOK's procedure in proposing constitutional amendments was constitutional. However, the surprising announcement of constitutional reform amidst tense political conditions with limited input from constitutional scholars increased the possibility of the crisis intensifying. An additional constitutional amendment was added following the controversial presidential vote: the removal of a secret ballot for president. Papandreou's proposals were designed to ease future changes to the constitution in Article 110, requiring amendments to be approved by a parliamentary majority in one rather than two successive parliaments and reducing the powers of the president. While the former proposal was eventually abandoned due to its controversial nature, he was determined to eliminate presidential powers. His argument was the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of kings of Greece to intervene in political life since the creation of the modern Greek state. PASOK minister Anastasios Peponis introduced the constitutional amendment package to parliament with the following argument:
Scholars considered such changes unnecessary since no president had used these powers in the course of the Third Hellenic Republic until Papandreou raised the issue. Anna Benaki-Psarouda, New Democracy's rapporteur, presented the following argument against the proposed reforms in parliament:
Benaki-Psarouda effectively argued that this type of majoritarianism would damage the quality of Greek democracy. Scholars also noted that the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful, "autocratic," position in the Greek state, as there would not be any constitutional restraints to their authority.
Revised provisions + Summary of the 1986 constitutional amendmentsChapter One: Election of the President Provision subject to revision Result after revision Article 32 §§1, 4 Establishment of a roll-call vote instead of a secret ballot for the election of the President of the Republic, both in the first and subsequent ballots, in the event of the dissolution of Parliament, the calling of elections, and the formation of a new Parliament. The provision for the dissolution of Parliament if the required majority is not achieved in the third ballot was repealed by the Ninth Revisionary Parliament in 2019. §2 The reference to the presidential authority, following an unsuccessful third vote for the election of a new president, to have the decree dissolving the Parliament signed by the incumbent president alone, was moved to a subsequent article, without explicitly assigning the authority to sign this decree to the President of the Hellenic Parliament in the absence of the President of the Republic.Chapter Two: Powers and responsibility arising from the President's acts Provision subject to revision Result after revision Article 35 §1 Repeal of the new prime minister's competence to countersign the decree dissolving the previous government, if the previous prime minister refuses to countersign it. Delegation of presidential competence, in the event that the Government is relieved of its duties, so that the relevant decree is signed only by the President of the Republic if the outgoing prime minister refuses to countersign it. §2 Abolition of uncountersigned presidential decrees convening the Council of Ministers and the President's statutory advisory body, the Council of the Republic. Abolition of uncountersigned presidential decrees dissolving the Parliament, following obvious discord with public sentiment, and decrees calling for a referendum on critical issues. Provision for presidential decrees without countersignature regarding the dissolution of Parliament, following two resignations or votes of no confidence against governments during the same parliamentary term and provided there is no parliamentary composition conducive to governmental stability, provided that the Prime Minister refuses to countersign, and for the dissolution of Parliament following the normal expiration of the parliamentary term, provided that the Cabinet refuses to countersign. §3 Provision for the President of the Parliament to sign the decree calling for a legislative referendum. Article 37 §§2-4 Reordering of the clauses of the paragraphs concerning the procedure for electing a leader by a parliamentary group, in the exceptional case where the party lacks a leader and representative or its leader was not elected as a member of parliament, so that it may receive a mandate to form a government or an exploratory mandate. Establishment of the timeframe for assigning the mandate. §3 Abolition of the presidential prerogative, provided that the exploratory mandate of the party with the largest parliamentary representation has failed, to either assign a second exploratory mandate to the leader of the second-largest party, or the appointment of a parliamentary or non-parliamentary figure as prime minister, following a relevant opinion from the Council of the Republic. Granting the President the binding authority to successively assign exploratory mandates to party leaders until one is successful; otherwise, to appoint as Prime Minister the candidate proposed by a national unity government to conduct elections; otherwise, a caretaker prime minister should be appointed, with the option to choose from among the widely accepted presidents of the three supreme courts to conduct elections. Article 38 §1 Abolition of the presidential prerogative, in the event that the Prime Minister has resigned or the government has lost a vote of confidence, either to entrust the mandate to form a new government to another member of Parliament, or to appoint a parliamentary or non-parliamentary figure as Prime Minister in order to conduct elections. Granting the President the authority to appoint a new Prime Minister, provided that the Government has resigned or lost a vote of confidence, to the leader of another party, following the procedure for exploratory mandates. §2 Abolition of the presidential power to dissolve the Government following a relevant opinion from the Council of the Republic. Provision for the President's authority to appoint a new Prime Minister from among the candidates proposed by the parliamentary group to which the previous Prime Minister belonged, provided that the latter has died or resigned (for personal reasons), while the Government remains in office. This provision was amended again by the Seventh Revisionary Parliament in 2001. §3 Abolition of the presidential prerogative to convene the Council of Ministers under his chairmanship in extraordinary circumstances. Article 39 §§1-2 Abolition of the presidential prerogative to convene the Council of the Republic - abolition of the institution. Article 41 §1 Abolition of the presidential prerogative to dissolve the Parliament, following a relevant opinion of the Council of the Republic, due to the Parliament's manifest discord with public sentiment.