The Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy Towards the North (), colloquially referred to as the Sunshine Policy (), is a theoretical basis adopted by the South Korean presidential administrations of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in regarding South Korea's foreign policy towards North Korea.
The policy was devised by president Kim Dae-jung in 1998. It resulted in greater political contact between the two states, leading to two inter-Korean summit meetings in Pyongyang (June 2000 and October 2007), as well as several high-profile business ventures, and brief meetings of family members separated by the Korean War. In 2000, Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his implementation of the Sunshine Policy.
Moon Jae-in's government began reconciling with North Korea following his election in 2017, thus beginning a revival of the Sunshine Policy. Moon's effort to improve the inter-Korean relationship resulted in three inter-Korean summits in a year, including two summits held in Panmunjom (April and May 2018) that marked the first inter-Korean summits to be held outside of Pyongyang, and one in Pyongyang (September 2018). Moon's version of the Sunshine Policy became known as the "Moonshine Policy".
Background The policy emerged largely in the context of the growing economic gap between the two Koreas: the South was strengthening itself and experiencing economic prosperity that had begun under President Park Chung Hee in the 1970s while the North was experiencing severe economic decline, consequently caused the 1990s North Korean famine and faced bankruptcy. The Sunshine Policy aimed at mitigating this gap in economic power and restoring lost communication between the two states.
Furthermore, the background to South Korea's decision to engage North Korea through cooperation rather than maintaining a conservative stance in the past shows a historical shift in the South Korea's domestic politics as well. According to Son Key-young, a South Korean author, the Sunshine Policy emerged ultimately as evidence of the evolving South Korean national identity since the Cold War. The end of the Cold War "ushered in an era of unprecedented confusion in South Korea over whether to define North Korea as friend or foe".
Etymology The policy is also known as The Operational Policy Towards the North () and The Embracing Policy ().
The term "Sunshine Policy" originates from a speech given by Kim Dae-jung after his election, in which he referenced The North Wind and the Sun, one of Aesop's fables.
In the tale, the north wind and the sun debate which one is stronger. They challenge each other to see who can get a passing traveler to remove his cloak. The wind tries with all its might to bluster and blow the cloak away, but the wind's chill makes the traveler cling to his cloak even more. The sun, however, has a different effect: its blistering rays cause the traveler to sweat and, unable to continue walking in the sweltering heat, he decides to take off his cloak. Therefore, the meaning can be interpreted as persuasion triumphing over force.
In the framework of this fable, South Korea needs to be warm towards the North in order for the latter to feel secure enough to 'remove its cloak' (make peace and disarm) instead of using the harsh wind (brute force and military aggression) which would only make the North cling to its 'cloak' (nationalism and isolation). Hence, the Sunshine Policy is based upon the notion that kindness and mutual co-operation are more effective than demands and aggression.
Overview The main aim of the policy was to soften North Korea's attitudes towards the South by encouraging interaction and economic assistance.
The national security policy had three basic principles: No military provocation from the North will be accepted; The South will not attempt to annex or occupy the North in any way; The South will actively seek peace and mutual partnership with the North.
These principles were meant to convey the message that the South does not wish to absorb the North or to undermine its government; its goal was peaceful coexistence rather than regime change. Kim Dae-jung's administration was well aware of the prevalent fear spread within North Korea, afraid of its own identity as a state being taken away through coerced integration or any interaction with the international community.
In line with these principles, Kim ordered that the term "reunification" be removed from the vocabulary used to describe relations with their northern neighbour as this promoted the idea that the South sought to absorb or destroy the North. Instead, they favoured terms such as "inter-Korean relations" or "policy towards North Korea".
Kim's administration also outlined two other core policies. The first was the separation of politics and economics. This hoped to facilitate inter-Korean trade despite any political challenges, boosting the North's economy and, in turn, inducing change in the North's economic policy.
The second component was reciprocity. Initially, it was intended that the two states would treat each other as equals, each making concessions and compromises, with the philosophy that "give and take" was required from both parties. Perhaps most criticism of the policy stemmed from the significant backpedaling by the South on this principle in the face of unexpected rigidity from the North. It ran into trouble just two months into the Sunshine era, when South Korea requested the creation of a reunion center for divided families in exchange for fertilizer assistance; North Korea denounced this as horse trading and cut off talks. A year later, the South announced its goal would be "flexible reciprocity" based on Confucian values; as the "elder brother" of the relationship, the South would provide aid without expecting an immediate reciprocation and without requesting a specific form of reciprocity. The South also announced that it would provide humanitarian assistance without any expectations of concessions in return.
The logic of the policy was based on the belief that, even in light of its continuing shortages and economic duress, the North's government will not collapse, disintegrate, or reform itself, even if the South were to apply strong pressure. It was believed that military tensions can be lessened through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. This emphasized the normalization of political and economic relations between both the United States and North Korea as well as Japan.
Sunshine Policy is often compared to the Western German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) which is a foreign policy of change through détente in the hopes of improving relations with East Germany, the Soviet Union, Poland and other Soviet Bloc countries in the early 1970s.
Kim Dae-jung Administration: 1998–2003
The Sunshine Policy was first formulated and implemented under Kim Dae-jung's government. North-South cooperative business developments began, including a railroad and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region, where several thousand South Korean citizens still traveled until 2008, when there was a shooting incident and the trips were cancelled. Though negotiations for them were difficult, three reunions between divided families were held.
The year 2000 marked a significant milestone in relations between the two states when Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il came together for the 2000 inter-Korean summit, the first-time leaders of each Korea had met since the end of the Civil War. The conference was held between 13 and 15 June. By the end of the meeting, the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration was adopted between the two Koreas. In the declaration, the two Koreas reached an agreement on five points, to settle the problem of independent reunification, to promote peaceful reunification, to solve humanitarian problems such as the issue of separated families, to encourage cooperation and exchange in their economy, and to have a dialogue between the North and South. After the summit, however, talks between the two states stalled. Criticism of the policy intensified and Unification Minister Lim Dong-won lost a no-confidence vote on September 3, 2001. Returning from his meeting in Washington with newly elected President Bush, Kim Dae-jung described his meeting as embarrassing while privately cursing President Bush and his hardliner approach. This meeting negated any chance of a North Korean visit to South Korea. With the Bush administration labeling North Korea as being part of the "axis of evil", North Korea renounced the non-proliferation treaty, kicked out UN inspectors, and restarted its nuclear program. In 2002 a short naval skirmish over disputed fishing territory killed six South Korean naval soldiers, further chilling relations.
Roh Moo-hyun administration: 2003–2008
President Roh Moo-hyun continued the policy of his predecessor, and relations on the divided peninsula warmed somewhat from 2002. In 2003, the issue of the North's possession of nuclear weapons surfaced again, with both North Korea and the United States accusing each other of breaching the Agreed Framework.
Nevertheless, Roh stayed committed to the policy and his government continued to supply the North with humanitarian aid. The two governments continued cooperation on the projects begun under Kim Dae-jung and also started the Kaesong Industrial Park, with South Korea spending the equivalent of just over $324 million on aid to the North in 2005.
Both the North and South Korean Governments agreed to hold a summit in Pyongyang on August 20, 2007, but this was later postponed to October 2 to 4 due in part to an internal crisis within North Korea. Unlike his predecessor Kim Dae-jung who travelled to Pyongyang by plane, Roh travelled from Seoul to Pyongyang overland by car on October 2. Roh made a stopover at Panmunjom and crossed the Military Demarcation Line by foot, stating that his gesture would symbolize the future reunification of Korea.
There appeared to be a pro-unification Korean trend in public attitudes during the Roh administration, though there are significant differences between generations, political groups, and regions.Estripes.com article But the ruling Uri Party, which strongly supported it, suffered electoral defeats and in 2008 the party lost its majority in the government. The new government took a harsher stance toward North Korea.
Criticism North Korean defector and journalist Kang Chol-hwan, who spent nine years in a North Korean prison, claims that Kim Dae-jung was mistaken in offering assistance to the North without any conditions of improving human rights in return. Kang disagrees with claims that the Sunshine Policy has led to a settlement of peace between North and South and questions the concept of no-strings-attached humanitarian aid, saying "it is important to understand that North Koreans are starving not because of a lack of aid from South Korea or the U.S., but because they are deprived of freedom. Giving aid only throws a line to the government, and prolongs starvation, surely a perverse outcome."
Furthermore, the policy built upon "flexible reciprocity" is often criticized to be an inappropriate ideal, bound to have realistic obstacles in Inter-Korea relations. Rather than viewing North Korea as a full equal to its power, South Korea took the stance that the stronger counterpart should wait patiently until the other has gained enough power, allowing North Korea to reciprocate with time. It is theorized that the 'time-differential' in the interaction between the two nations did not aid in the restoration of trust and cooperation but led to further problems in missing transparency and the delay in fully understanding the implications of the policy, which did not benefit the mass as much as expected.