In United States law, habeas corpus () is a recourse challenging the reasons or conditions of a person's confinement. Petitioning the government for habeas corpus is a right in the United States. Individual states may also afford persons the ability to petition their own state court systems for habeas corpus pursuant to their respective constitutions and laws when held or sentenced by state authorities.

Habeas corpus, permits a court to collaterally review the final judgment of another court in contrast to other writs like certiorari and coram nobis that provide direct review of a judgment. Federal habeas review did not extend to those in state custody until almost a century after the nation's founding with the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The petition for habeas corpus is filed with a court that has jurisdiction over the custodian, and if granted, a writ is issued directing the custodian to bring the confined person before the court for examination into those reasons or conditions.

For many decades, most federal habeas petitions have been filed by state prisoners seeking post-conviction review of state-court judgments, since most crimes in the American system have historically been matters of state law. Modern habeas corpus rules, emphasizing comity and finality, have narrowed the circumstances in which courts may exercise this jurisdiction. The modern federal habeas statute that resulted, as amended by Congress to codify some of these limitations, is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Statutory history

Habeas corpus was first established by statute in the Judiciary Act of 1789. This statutory writ applied only to those who "are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify" and not to those held by state governments, which independently afford habeas corpus pursuant to their respective constitutions and laws. From 1789 until 1866, the federal writ of habeas corpus was largely restricted to prisoners in federal custody, at a time when no direct appeals from federal criminal convictions were provided for by law. Habeas corpus remained the only means for judicial review of federal capital convictions until 1889, and the only means for review of federal convictions for other "infamous crimes" until 1891.

The writ of habeas corpus remained the only way that decisions of military courts could be reviewed by the Supreme Court until the passage of the Military Justice Act of 1983, which extended it to the writ of certiorari.

The authority of federal courts to review the claims of prisoners in state custody was not clearly established until Congress adopted a statute (28 U.S.C. § 2254) granting federal courts that authority in 1867, as part of the post-Civil War Reconstruction. The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Waley v. Johnson (1942)316 U.S. 101 (1942) interpreted this authority broadly to allow the writ to be used to challenge convictions or sentences in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights where no other remedy was available.

The 1948 amendments to the federal habeas statute provided that a court need not entertain a successive petition when the legality of the prisoner's detention had already been determined in a prior application and no new ground was presented.

Federal law

28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants federal courts jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons held in custody under specified federal authority or in violation of federal law.

In the 1950s and 1960s, decisions by the Warren Court greatly expanded the use and scope of the federal writ largely due to the "constitutionalizing" of criminal procedure by applying the Bill of Rights, in part, to state courts using the incorporation doctrine. This afforded state prisoners many more opportunities to claim that their convictions were unconstitutional, which provided grounds for habeas corpus relief. Subsequent court rulings and legislation have somewhat narrowed the writ.

The Civil Rights Act of 1968 at makes habeas corpus available in federal court to test the legality of detention by Native American tribes.

Pre-AEDPA habeas procedures

By the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court had preserved limited avenues for federal habeas courts to address claims involving serious constitutional defects and the risk of miscarriages of justice. In Wright v. West (1992), Herrera v. Collins (1993), Kyles v. Whitley (1995), and Schlup v. Delo (1995), the Court addressed the scope of habeas review of actual innocence, Brady violations, and other constitutional claims. Herrera held that actual innocence was not itself a freestanding ground for habeas relief, while Schlup recognized actual innocence as a gateway to review of otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims. Other procedural claims, including mixed questions of law and fact and ineffective assistance of counsel, remained important avenues for challenging convictions and sentences. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 subsequently imposed additional statutory restrictions on federal habeas review.

AEDPA

In 1996, following the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed (91–8 in the Senate, 293–133 in the House) and President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) substantially limiting collateral postconviction review of state-court judgments. For the first time, its Section 101 set a statute of limitations of one year following conviction for prisoners to seek the writ. The Act limits the power of federal judges to grant relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim has resulted in a decision that

Is contrary to, or has involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or Has resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor (Terry Williams) (2000), the Supreme Court held that AEDPA changed the longstanding practice of de novo review, requiring federal courts to give greater deference to state-court judgments. The Court's earlier decision in Brown v. Allen (1953) had been understood to endorse de novo review, although Wright v. West (1992) questioned whether Brown had done so.

AEDPA's language raised several questions about the scope of federal habeas review. These included whether the use of "was" meant that federal courts could consider only the law in effect when the state court issued its decision, the distinction between a decision that was "contrary to" clearly established federal law and one involving an "unreasonable application" of that law, and the standard applicable when a state court had not adjudicated a claim on the merits. Federal courts addressed these and other questions in the years following AEDPA's enactment. In Cullen v. Pinholster (2011), for example, the Supreme Court held that federal courts sitting in habeas generally consider only the record that was before the state court. In Harrington v. Richter (2011), in an opinion by Anthony Kennedy, the Court interpreted § 2254(d) to require substantial deference to state-court decisions, characterizing its purpose as just stopping “short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.”

After the 2011 term of the Supreme Court, federal habeas relief was available only in the rare case where “not one fair-minded jurist” could agree with the state court's understanding or application of federal law.

AEDPA barred second or successive petitions generally but with several exceptions. Petitioners who had already filed a federal habeas petition were required first to secure a certificate of appealability appropriate United States Court of Appeals, to ensure that such an exception was at least facially made out. The death penalty became a particularly important setting for debates over habeas corpus procedure. Joseph L. Hoffmann described the difficulty of reaching the merits of constitutional claims in capital cases as an extreme example of the “excessive proceduralism” of federal habeas corpus.

IIRAIRA

Habeas corpus allows noncitizens detained during immigration proceedings to challenge the legality of their detention and, in some circumstances, the immigration orders against them. The scope of habeas review has changed as Congress altered the procedures for reviewing immigration orders. Under the Immigration Act of 1917, Heikkila v. Barber (1953) treated habeas corpus as the sole means of challenging deportation orders because the statute made the Attorney General's decisions final. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro (1955) subsequently allowed noncitizens to challenge deportation orders under the Administrative Procedure Act without first being detained. Congress replaced that framework in 1961 by assigning review of deportation orders to the courts of appeals.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) carried forward AEDPA's restrictions on judicial review of criminal noncitizens and broadened them to include certain grounds of inadmissibility, raising questions about the availability of habeas corpus review. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr (2001),533 U.S. 289 (2001) the U.S. Supreme Court said the Suspension Clause protects "the writ as it existed in 1789", that is, as a writ which federal judges could issue in the exercise of their common law authority. The Supreme Court concluded that did not preclude habeas corpus petitions raising legal challenges to removal orders, leaving the district courts with habeas jurisdiction over such claims. After St. Cyr Congress made changes to the law to limit judicial review of orders of removal and provide an "adequate substitute" for habeas review in accordance with the St. Cyr decision. This "Limited Review Provision"§1252(2)(D) permits "review of constitutional claims or questions of law" for aliens who are removable because they have committed a crime.

Suspension Clause At the 1787 Constitutional Convention habeas corpus was first introduced with a series of propositions on August 20 by Charles Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina.Suspension of the Habeas Corpus, The New York Times, June 2, 1861Madison Debates, August 20Charles Pinckney National Historic Site, Historic Resource Study, p. 7 Habeas corpus was discussed and voted on substantively on August 28, 1787.Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-term Executive Detention , p. 21 Two votes were cast on a motion by Gouverneur Morris, delegate from Pennsylvania, for addition to the Constitution of the clause, "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of rebellion or invasion the