Balticconnector is a bi-directional natural gas pipeline between Ingå, Finland and Paldiski, Estonia operated by Gasgrid Finland and Elering. It connects the Estonian and Finnish gas grids, and provides Finland with access to the Inčukalns underground gas storage facility in Latvia.
The subsea pipeline and a nearby data cable were damaged in October 2023. The pipeline was repaired and began operation again after six months. The Chinese authorities reported that the anchor of the Hong Kong-flagged ship NewNew Polar Bear was responsible for breaking the pipeline. The Chinese authorities stated it was an accident, while "both the Estonian and Finnish inquiries are ongoing." The damage to the pipeline did not result in any critical consequences, as Estonia could obtain gas from other pipelines and gas only accounts for 5% of Finland’s energy consumption.
Technical description The project consists of of a bi-directional offshore pipeline between Ingå in Finland and Paldiski in Estonia, of onshore pipeline in Finland between Ingå and Siuntio, and of onshore pipeline in Estonia between Paldiski and Kiili. There are also metering and compressor stations in Ingå and in Kersalu, Estonia. The offshore part is operated jointly by Elering and Baltic Connector, while onshore sections of the pipeline will be developed separately by each party. Originally, there was also a proposal for alternative long route from Vuosaari (district of Helsinki) to Paldiski.
The offshore section and the Finnish onshore section use pipes with an operating pressure of . The Estonian onshore section uses a pipe with an operating pressure of . In Estonia the pipeline is connected to the existing transmission pipeline from Latvia, which will be enhanced. The initial capacity of pipeline is . Later, it will increase up to . The pipeline cost €300 million, of which 206 million were financed by the European Commission.
The onshore section in Estonia was built by EG Ehitus AS, a subsidiary of Eesti Gaas, and the offshore section was built by Allseas. The offshore pipeline was laid by the pipe-laying vessel Lorelay. Pipes were supplied by Corinth Pipeworks Pipe Industry S.A., Greece.
Critical maritime infrastructure The Balticconnector pipeline and the cables damaged along with it, is categorized as critical maritime infrastructure (CMI). Critical maritime infrastructure covers objects like ports, windfarms, cables and pipelines. This infrastructure is categorized as critical because modern societies are dependent on them in order to supply important resources like energy, food, or communication. Although this infrastructure is deemed critical, it has historically had very little protection due to the difficulty of monitoring these enormous distances that the pipes cover, as well as them being subsea, making them impossible to guard from the surface or airspace. The damage of this type of infrastructure is relatively common, and stems from nature phenomena, such as tsunamis, or routine maritime activity related to fishing and shipping. Deliberate interference with this type of critical maritime infrastructure remains less prominent until 2022 where The Nordstream sabotage and Balticonnector acts as central catalysts for contemporary critical maritime infrastructure protection agenda.
History The project was proposed originally by the Finnish natural gas company Gasum in cooperation with Eesti Gaas of Estonia. After implementation of the EU third energy package, EG Võrguteenus, a former subsidiary of Eesti Gaas, replaced the latter. Later EG Võrguteenus was acquired by, and became a part of the Estonian transmission system operator Elering. In October 2015, Gasum abandoned the project due to commercial viability. It was replaced by the Finnish state-owned company Baltic Connector OY.
The feasibility study was completed in May 2007. A preliminary environmental impact assessment programme was done in 2010. In 2010, the European Commission financed the investigation of possibilities to create more diversified natural gas grid within the Baltic Sea Region, which included also the Balticconnector project. The seabed studies started in November 2013. In 2016 the project received a grant form the European Union support program Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) because the project was categorized as an EU Project of Common Interest (CPI). The interconnector was seen as a prospect to end Finland's isolation from the European gas network, to secure gas supply and increase the energy integration in the Baltic region. The project received a €187,5 million grant from the CEF which covered 75% of the construction cost.
The construction agreement was signed between Elering and Baltic Connector on 17 October 2016. The cornerstone of the pipeline was laid on 8 June 2018 in Ingå. The ceremony was attended by Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure of Estonia Kadri Simson, Minister of the Environment and Energy of Finland Kimmo Tiilikainen, European Commission member Jyrki Katainen and the managers of Elering and Baltic Connector Oy. Laying the offshore pipeline started on 20 May 2019 and was completed on 24 June 2019. Shielding of the offshore section were completed by 12 July 2019.
The onshore section in Estonia was filled with gas on 23 October 2019 and the offshore section was filled with gas on 27 November 2019. The pipeline was inaugurated on 11 December 2019 by ceremonies in Helsinki and Paldiski. The ceremonies were attended by presidents of Estonia and Finland Kersti Kaljulaid and Sauli Niinistö, ministers of economy Taavi Aas and Mika Lintilä, Deputy Director-General of European Commission Energy Directorate Klaus-Dieter Borchardt and the managers of Elering and Baltic Connector Oy.
Balticconnector started commercial operations on 1 January 2020. During the first month of operation it supplied over a third of Finnish gas demand, 885 GWh. By comparison, the domestic Estonian consumption was 565 GWh.
After the commissioning of a gas interconnection between Poland and Lithuania in 2022, Estonia and (via the Balticconnector) Finland have been connected to the Polish and internal EU gas markets, and vice versa; Estonia received LNG shipments via Inkoo LNG terminal in May 2023.
In the wake of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the northeastern European states decided to sanction the Russian Federation and their gas supply. Past supply to the Balticconnector was from Russia but from 2023 LSEG data showed the shipping terminals at Klaipėda and Ingå favoured gas from the United States and Norway. In June 2024 the EU officially sanctioned Russian LNG supply in their 14th package.
2023 damage incident
As of 2023, the pipeline was transporting 30 GWh/day from Finland to Estonia. On 8 October 2023, around 02:00 local time, the two operating companies Gasgrid Finland and Elering (Estonia) noticed a sudden drop in pressure in the line, from 34.5 bar to 12 bar, and then to 6 bar. The operators closed the valves to stop the flow. They later discovered a leak caused by a damaged pipe in the sea. The EE-S1 telecoms cable, near the pipeline, was also damaged, along with a Russian and a Estonia-Finnish submarine cable .
On 10 October 2023, the Finnish government announced that the damage to the pipeline may have been deliberate and caused by "external activity". The leak was investigated by the Finnish Border Guard and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. Norwegian seismological institute NORSAR reported that it detected a "probable explosion" 40 km north of Paldiski (roughly where Balticconnector and Nord Stream intersect) on the 8 October at 01:20 local time. A few days later investigators stated the damage "appears to have been mechanical, not an explosion".
On 11 October 2023, an Estonian Navy commander stated that Finnish images of the damage showed the pipeline's concrete cover had been broken off and the pipeline was badly damaged on one side and out of position. A Finnish member of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats suggested that one possibility was that a ship's anchor had dragged over the pipeline. Five large ships had been near the pipeline shortly before the incident. Finland's National Bureau of Investigations opened an investigation into the potential "intentional damaging" of the pipeline by the Chinese vessel in response.
On 21 October 2023, Finnish authorities reported that the Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear was in the area at the time of the incident and that the role of this ship was being investigated. The Newnew Polar Bear was accompanied by the Russian nuclear-powered container ship Sevmorput, however, Finnish authorities did not state that this container ship caused the physical damage to the pipeline. On 24 October 2023, it was reported that Finnish authorities had observed gouges in the seabed starting on one side of the pipeline and ending the other side, near where they found a damaged ship's anchor, missing much of one fluke.A photo of the ship from October 22, 2023 in the Russian Arctic port Arkhangelsk shows that the ship is missing its portside anchor. Newnew Polar Bear sailed through the Gulf of Finland on 24 October 2023. As the vessel was sailing in territorial waters, the Finnish authorities were unable to stop the ship, in spite of them requesting to stop.
During the outage, gas supply to the Finnish gas network is based on the FSRU Exemplar, a floating regasification plant with a capacity of 40 TWh/year moored at the port of Inkoo. Gas can also be supplied from the LNG terminal in Hamina at 6 GWh/day and from biogas plants. The pipeline operators state that repairs will take at least five months, with an earliest projected restart in April 2024.
The offshore pipeline repair project was led by Norwegian energy major Equinor, on behalf of operators Gasgrid Finland and Estonian electricity transmission grid operator Elering. The pipeline resumed commercial operation after repairs were completed on 22 April 2024.
On 12 August 2024, the Chinese government admitted the incident was the fault of NewNew Shipping Line "by accident" caused by "a strong storm". Estonian investigating authorities had submitted a request to the Chinese government "to gather evidence from the vessel and its crew" but this request had still to be permitted.
On 8 May 2025, the captain of the ship was reportedly remanded in custody in Hong Kong. He is suspected of one count of criminal damage, two counts of violation of local marine by-laws, and of breaching navigation safety protocols. The case is scheduled to be heard in Hong Kong courts in early 2027, and the captain denies the charges.
Legal dimension The interconnector was damaged in Finland's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ is defined by the treaty United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). In the EEZ coastal states have exclusive sovereign rights to exploit and extract resources and a responsibility for environmental protection in a zone stretching 200 nautical miles from the state’s coastline which means that the coastal state do not have any other jurisdiction for legal questions in the EEZ. Therefore Finland did not have jurisdiction to retain or board ships that are under investigation since only the ship’s flag state obtains the right.
UNCLOS Article 113