The 1983 Arizona copper mine strike began as a labour dispute between the Phelps Dodge Corporation and a group of union copper miners and mill workers, led by the United Steelworkers. The subsequent strike lasted nearly three years and resulted in the replacement of most of the striking workers and decertification of the unions. It is regarded as an important event in the history of the United States labor movement.Rosenblum, Jonathan D. Copper Crucible: How the Arizona Miners' Strike of 1983 Recast Labor-Management Relations in America, Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 1995, p.217.
Background In 1981, the price of copper plummeted from a high of $1.40 in February to $.75 (seventy-five cents) per pound by December 18, resulting in losses for the entire copper industry. In 1981, the copper industry as a whole laid off approximately 50% (or 11,000) of its workers statewide. Phelps Dodge continued to operate with full manpower throughout most of 1981, although it continued to lose money. In December 1981, Phelps Dodge announced that it would lay off 108 workers in Arizona and New Mexico on January 3, 1982, and place the rest of the workers on a four-day work week in order to minimize the impact of the layoffs. In doing so, unlike the rest of the copper industry, Phelps Dodge continued to operate and pay its workers and reduce its production by 20%.Kingman Daily Miner, December 18, 1981
Phelps Dodge announced salary cuts to management personnel and laid off 100 salaried employees. On April 7, 1982, Phelps Dodge announced it would lay off all 3,400 of its hourly workers in Texas and Arizona, because of its losses. Phelps Dodge laid off workers, and a total of approximately 12,000 copper workers had been laid off across the industry. None of the copper mines in Arizona continued to operate.
Company PR efforts Company chairman George B. Munroe decided to hold a series of "town hall meetings" to talk directly to the workers. "The copper you produce here," he told the miners, had to compete with copper produced in Canada, South America, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Australia. Essentially the price for copper is the same all over the world. And no U. S. producer can continue operating for very long when its cost of producing a pound of copper approaches or exceeds the price for which it can be sold. Munroe also pointed out that Arizona miners wages had risen at an annual rate of nearly 15 percent during the 1970s, while the average U. S. manufacturing employee had seen only a 10 percent increase.Copper Crucible: how the Arizona miners' strike of 1983 recast labor "The same eight dollars that Phelps Dodge pays for forty minutes of work", Munroe went on to say, "would buy more than a full shift of work from the average mining employee at a large South American copper company." Many of the unions in other industries had already agreed to pay cuts. Munroe said that the copper industry could be no exception.
Although copper prices remained stagnant throughout 1982, Phelps Dodge ended its shutdown, calling more than half the work force back about five months after Munroe's visits.Copper Crucible: how the Arizona miner's strike of 1983 recast labor, by Jonathan D Rosenblaum All of the other copper companies continued their shutdowns.
Phelps Dodge lost money in 1982, which added to its debt burden. Other copper companies were then owned by large oil companies (Anaconda was owned by Atlantic Richfield, Cypress by Standard of Indiana, and Kennecott by Standard of Ohio) and could sustain losses, but Phelps Dodge was by itself. With no expectation of higher copper prices for years to come, management concluded that to survive, Phelps Dodge needed a long-term plan to reduce labor costs. To accomplish that, it determined to eliminate the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) from the upcoming union contract.Carlos A Schwantes, Vision & Enterprise: Exploring the History of Phelps Dodge Corporation (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000) 312-327.
Contract negotiations In April 1983, rival copper producer Kennecott and its unions agreed on a contract that froze base pay for three years. The union leadership considered that it had accommodated the suffering copper industry by agreeing to no wage increases for three years, except for the usual cost-of-living adjustments. It expected that the new Kennecott agreement would be quickly duplicated with all the other copper producers, the same system of pattern bargaining that had obtained for years in the industry, but Phelps Dodge decided not to follow the Kennecott agreement. It also decided and announced publicly that it could not afford to do so and would not shut down for a strike.
In April 1983, Phelps Dodge began negotiating with a coalition of its 13 labor unions, led by the United Steel Workers. Phelps Dodge insisted that it required elimination of cost-of-living adjustment, a freeze in wages, worker copayments for health care, and a lower wage scale for new hires. The unions believed that to give in to Phelps Dodge would destroy the system of uniform wages in the copper industry, which had served them so well for years. Heading the union bargaining team was Frank S. McKee, a veteran negotiator who had risen in the union from working the furnaces at Bethlehem Steel. McKee was preparing to run for the presidency of the United Steelworkers, and did not want to be perceived as weak. At the same time, the unions were also negotiating with Magma Copper and ASARCO. In June, both Magma and ASARCO agreed to contracts on the pattern set by Kennecott, which left Phelps Dodge the only holdout. The two sides could not agree on cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) and job combinations.Book On 1983 Copper Strike Draws Wrong Lessons, The Militant, Dan Fein, August 21, 1995
Strike Negotiations between Phelps Dodge and the unions failed to reach an agreement, and a strike began on midnight of July 30, including workers from Morenci, Ajo, Clifton, and Douglas, Arizona. Thousands of miners walked out and a picket line was formed at the Morenci Mine. The next day, Phelps Dodge increased security personnel in and around the mine.
However, then Phelps Dodge did exactly what it had announced it would do, but almost everyone had thought it was empty bravado. The company continued to produce copper during the strike for the first time since 1959. Since then, the company, like other copper companies, had shut down during strikes by often using the down time to perform needed maintenance. Copper mining companies did not want to incur the anger and the violence that they knew would happen if they maintained copper production during a strike. Some business analysts considered Phelps Dodge actions to be risky or foolish. A July 1983 cover of Business Week declared a "Management Crisis at Phelps Dodge."
The Phelps Dodge plants were kept running by plant supervisors and by office personnel, some brought in from the New York headquarters. They worked 12-hour shifts with some union workers who ignored the strike, about 700 according to the company. As expected, angry picketers shouted insults at those entering and leaving the plants. Picketers with bullhorns identified picket-line crossers by name. People spread roofing nails on roads going into the plants. Phelps Dodge succeeded in obtaining court orders limiting the number of picket, but generally did not succeed in getting them enforced. The Greenlee County Board of Supervisors imposed a 9 pm to 6 am curfew, but the Clifton City Council instructed its police not to enforce it.
Strikebreakers, the workers who continued working during the strike, received threatening phone calls, and car windows and windows in their homes were smashed. Company-owned railroad bridges were set afire. At the El Paso smelter, a group of strikers incapacitated a police dog by beating it with steel rebar, baseball bats, and two-by-fours. A bullet fired into the home of a strikebreaker in Ajo lodged in the brain of his sleeping two-year-old daughter. An automobile caravan of more than 100 cars wound through Clifton and threw rocks through the windows of strikebreakers' homes. At the same time, strikers and their supporters claimed that acts of violence by strikebreakers often were not prosecuted by authorities or reported in the media.Kingsolver, Barbara. Holding the Line: Women in the Great Arizona Mine Strike of 1983. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 1989. In August, miners were subject to undercover surveillance by the Arizona Criminal Intelligence Systems Agency to identify the strikers engaged in violence.Union Busting: How Arizona's 'CIA' Helped Phelps Dodge Destroy The Unions, Tucson Weekly, Jonathan Rosenblum, June 29-July 5, 1995 Meanwhile, the local government passed injunctions limiting both picketing and demonstrations at the mine.
Hiring replacement workers On August 5, Phelps Dodge announced it they would begin hiring permanent replacement workers for the Morenci Mine. The company took out large employment ads for new workers in the Tucson and Phoenix newspapers and advertised that the average annual wage for its employees was $26,200, plus what it calculated as $10,500 in benefits. Many people considered that an attractive wage, which had an effect in curbing sympathy for the strikers. However, the advertisements also greatly increased the anger of the strikers, who now faced permanent loss of their jobs. The company offered new workers virtually the same deal it had offered the unions, which had turned them down. Instead of an annual cost of living raise pegged to inflation, Phelps Dodge offered an annual wage review pinned to the price of copper. If copper increased, employees would receive a raise. It offered new workers $7.00 an hour instead of over $9.00. Instead of offering free doctor visits in the company hospital, they began to require a $5.00 copayment. The union leaders turned that down, but hundreds of workers from Tucson and Phoenix accepted it. Eventually, many of the union workers went back to work as well.
Tensions grew as Phelps Dodge prepared to bring in permanent replacements. On August 8, Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt flew to Morenci and got Phelps Dodge to agree on a ten-day freeze on hiring replacement workers. Babbitt flew back to Phoenix believing that he had averted violence.
However, the next day, August 9, a crowd of 100 gathered outside the gates of the Morenci mine and plant. Many in the crowd carried chains and baseball bats, and guns could be seen in many of their cars. Arizona state police officers told Phelps Dodge managers that an attack appeared imminent and that they would not be able to protect the plant or those inside it.Jonathan D. Rosenblum, Copper Crucible: how the Arizona Miners Strike of 1983 Recast Labor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998) 95.
Union representatives had stayed out of the assembled crowd to avoid making the unions liable for any violent actions, but they requested an urgent meeting with company management inside the plant. In a scene that writer Jonathan Rosenblum likened to an Old West showdown, as both sides watched, two Phelps Dodge managers walked out the gate and onto the middle of US Highway 191 (all traffic had been rerouted). Down the empty highway walked two union representatives to meet them. A state police official joined the group to mediate. The union men told Phelps Dodge that they had no control over the crowd and that the crowd was planning to storm the mine and plant unless the company shut down operations by the 3 pm shift change. The company men agreed to shut down.Jonathan D Rosenblum, Copper Crucible, quoted on US Department of Transportation website, US 666.