In existential philosophy, ecstasy (from the Ancient Greek [] 'to be or stand outside oneself, a removal to elsewhere'; from 'out' and 'stand' or 'standoff of forces') describes a sense of being "outside-itself". One's consciousness, for example, is not self-enclosed, as one can be conscious of an Other person, who falls well outside one's own self. In a sense, consciousness is usually "outside itself", in that its object (what it thinks about, or perceives) is not itself. This is in contrast to the term enstasis which means from "standing-within-oneself" which relates to contemplation from the perspective of a speculator.
This understanding of enstasis gives way to the example of the use of the "ecstasy" as that one can be "outside of oneself" with time. In temporalizing, each of the following: the past (the "having-been"), the future (the "not-yet") and the present (the "making-present") are the "outside of itself" of each other. The term ecstasy () has been used in this sense by Martin Heidegger who, in his Being and Time of 1927, argued that our "being-in-the-world" (that is, existence or ) is usually focused toward some person, task, or the past. Telling someone to "remain in the present" could then be self-contradictory, if the present only emerged as the "outside itself" of future possibilities (our projection; ) and past facts (our thrownness; ).As existentialist scholar Alphonso Lingis writes: "Existential philosophy defined the new concepts of ecstasy or of transcendence to fix a distinct kind of being that is by casting itself out of its own given place and time, without dissipating, because at each moment it projects itself — or, more exactly, a variant of itself — into another place and time. Such a being is not ideality, defined as intuitable or reconstitutable anywhere and at any moment. Ex-istence, understood etymologically, is not so much a state or a stance as a movement, which is by conceiving a divergence from itself or a potentiality of itself and casting itself into that divergence with all that it is." —Lingis, Alphonso. "The Imperative," Indiana University Press, 1998.
Emmanuel Levinas disagreed with Heidegger's position regarding ecstasy and existential temporality from the perspective of the experience of insomnia.Nicholas Bunnin, Dachun Yang, Linyu Gu (eds), Levinas: Chinese and Western Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, 2009, p. 19. Levinas talked of the Other in terms of 'insomnia' and 'wakefulness'.A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology World Wide, Springer, 2003, p. 421. He emphasized the absolute otherness of the Other and established a social relationship between the Other and one's self.Nicholas Bunnin et al (eds), 2009, p. 18. Furthermore, he asserted that ecstasy, or exteriority toward the Other, forever remains beyond any attempt at full capture; this otherness is interminable or infinite.Sociality is a "relation ... to the infinite" (E. Levinas, Le temps et l'autre, Presses universitaires de France, 1991, p. 8). The "relation with the Other" [rapport à autrui] is one among the "inevitable articulations of the transcendence of time" [articulations ... inévitables de la transcendance du temps] which are "neither ecstasy where the Same is absorbed in(to) the Other nor knowledge where the Other belongs to the Same" [ni extase où le Même s'absorbe dans l'Autre ni savoir où l'Autre appartient au Même] (ibid., p. 13). This "infiniteness" of the Other would allow Levinas to derive other aspects of philosophy as secondary to this ethic. Levinas writes:
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