The Seventeen-Point Agreement (officially the Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet) was an agreement between the Local Government of Tibet and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to formalize the annexation of Tibet. It was signed by plenipotentiaries of the CPG and the Tibetan Government (Ganden Phodrang) on 23 May 1951, in Zhongnanhai, Beijing. The 14th Dalai Lama ratified the agreement in the form of a telegraph on 24 October 1951 even though the United States informed him that in order to receive assistance and support from the United States, he must depart from Tibet and publicly disavow "agreements concluded under duress". However, from the U.S. perspective, charges of Chinese Communist aggression would have little resonance if the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa and ratified the agreement, so a major effort was made to persuade him to denounce the Seventeen-Point Agreement and flee into exile. The Dalai Lama stated that the Tibetan local government, ecclesiastic and secular folk, unanimously support the agreement, and will actively support the People's Liberation Army in Tibet in consolidating national defense, drive out imperialist influences from Tibet, and safeguard the unification of the territory and the sovereignty of the Motherland.
More than 7 years after the ratification of the agreement, after his arrival in India on 19 March 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama issued a statement that the agreement was made under pressure of the Chinese Government, and the Dalai Lama and his Government tried their best to adhere to the 17 Point Agreement. On 20 June 1959, he stated that the agreement was between two independent and sovereign States, and the consent of the government was secured under duress. Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, who led the Tibetan delegation during the agreement's negotiations, claimed that there was no duress involved.: "" ["Ngapoi: 'A big ethnic group would never oppress a small ethnic group...'"]: "" ["Ngapoi and others said in the letter: 'It is now an opportune time for peace talks. The Communist Party does not have the desire to give coercive orders, and everything can be negotiated and decided calmly.'"] The Central Tibetan Administration, which was formed after 1960, stated in 2021 that the agreement was not signed with the mutual consent of both parties, the agreement had no legal validity even though it was ratified by the 14th Dalai Lama.
Background After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, the 13th Dalai Lama declared the independence of Tibet. This de facto independence was repeatedly challenged by the Chinese government in Beijing. On 1 October 1949, the 10th Panchen Lama wrote a telegraph to congratulate the Chinese communists on the liberation of the northwest and the establishment of People's Republic of China. He also expressed his excitement at the impending liberation of Tibet. The People's Liberation Army crossed the Jinsha River on 6 or 7 October 1950 and defeated the Tibetan army by 19 October at the Battle of Chamdo. Instead of continuing with the military campaign, China asked Tibet to send representatives to Beijing to negotiate an agreement. The Dalai Lama believes the draft agreement was written by China, and Tibetan representatives were not allowed to suggest any alterations. China did not allow the Tibetan representatives to communicate with the Tibetan government in Lhasa. The Tibetan delegation was not authorized by Lhasa to sign, but ultimately submitted to pressure from the Chinese to sign anyway, using seals which had been specifically made for the purpose. After the second negotiation, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme telegraphed to and sought feedback from the Kashag insisting on the deployment of troops.https://www.12371.cn/2021/09/10/VIDE1631259904680458.shtml 第二次谈判结束后，西藏地方政府谈判代表团以阿沛的名义向拉萨和亚东噶厦发电：“中央坚持要向边防派驻军队，是为了保卫国防安全，并不强制干涉西藏内部事务。中央不可能改变，如不接受，谈判进行不下去，无法达成协议。” 在电报的最后，阿沛还强调：“请尽快回复，如在二、三日得不到指示，代表团自行做主接受这一条，以利于谈判继续。” After the second round of negotiations, the Tibetan local government negotiation delegation sent a telegram to Lhasa and Yadong Kashag in the name of Ngapoi: "The central government insists on deploying troops to the border to protect national defense and security, and does not forcibly interfere in Tibet's internal affairs. The central government cannot change its mind. If you do not accept it, the negotiations will not go on and no agreement can be reached." At the end of the telegram, Ngapoi also emphasized: "Please reply as soon as possible. If no instructions are received within two or three days, the delegation will decide on its own to accept this clause to facilitate the continuation of negotiations."
After Ngapo Ngawang Jigmei returned to Lhasa from Beijing, the Tibetan government convened an "official meeting" from 26 to 29 September, which included all monks and lay officials, abbots of the three major monasteries, and officers of the Tibetan army above the rank of Jiaben, totaling more than 300 people. The meeting approved the statement presented to the Dalai Lama: "The signed 17-point agreement will be of great benefit to the Dalai Lama's great cause, and to the Buddhist teachings, politics, and economy of Tibet. It is unparalleled, and should be followed and implemented."https://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/07-11/3173801_2.shtml 阿沛·阿旺晋美从北京回到拉萨后，西藏地方政府于9月26至29日召开了全体僧俗官员、三大寺堪布、藏军甲本以上军官等300多人的“官员大会”，通过了向达赖喇嘛的呈文：“签订的《十七条协议》，对于达赖之宏业，西藏之佛法、政治、经济诸方面，大有裨益，无以伦比，理当遵照执行。” After Ngapo Ngawang Jigmei returned to Lhasa from Beijing, the Tibetan local government convened an "official meeting" from September 26 to 29, which included all monks and lay officials, abbots of the three major monasteries, and officers of the Tibetan army above the rank of Jiaben, totaling more than 300 people. The meeting adopted the statement presented to the Dalai Lama: "The signed 17-point agreement will be of great benefit to the Dalai Lama's great cause, and to the Buddhist teachings, politics, and economy of Tibet. It is unparalleled, and should be followed and implemented." The 14th Dalai Lama ratified the agreement in the form of a telegraph on 24 October 1951.
Agreement
Agreement text Agreement between the Central People's Government and the Tibetan Local Government on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet:
Negotiations The Tibetan delegation initially objected to point 1's reference to "invading imperialist forces" but later conceded that there may be such forces operating in Tibet that they were not aware of. Points 2 and 3 were queried for the meaning of "local government", although the meaning of "national regional autonomy" was not discussed, since the Tibetan delegation assumed that things would go on as before. Ngapoi's delegation tried to remove the guarantees of the power for the Panchen Lama in points 5 and 6, but the Chinese delegation countered that the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama should be treated in the same manner; either both have their power guaranteed, or neither does. The Tibetans conceded the point. Fundamental disagreements about point 8, the disbandment of the Tibetan army, resulted in a promise to renegotiate the issue later. The most contentious point was 15, concerning the establishment of a military and administrative committee, since Tibetan delegation felt that it contradicted point 11 about the local Tibetan government conducting reforms on its own. Most of the other points were accepted without comment, or with minor translation adjustments. In order to avoid embarrassment for the Chinese delegation, accommodations to the Tibetan delegation about issues like the maintenance of the Tibetan army were to be concluded subsequently in separate, secret agreements.
Signing of the agreement The agreement was signed by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, who advocated Tibetan acquiescence to China, and sealed in Beijing on 23 May 1951 and confirmed by the government in Tibet a few months later. In addition, a public announcement was made by the Dalai Lama to ratify the agreement, his acceptance also being sent to Beijing in the form of a telegram on 24 October 1951:
"This year, the plenipotentiary of the Tibetan Local Government, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme and other five people, arrived in Beijing at the end of April 1951 to conduct peace talks with the plenipotentiary designated by the Central People’s Government. On the basis of friendship, representatives of the both sides signed the agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet on 23 May 1951. The Tibet Local Government, as well as ecclesiastic and secular folk, unanimously support this agreement, and under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central People's Government, will actively support the People's Liberation Army in Tibet in consolidating national defense, drive out imperialist influences from Tibet, and safeguard the unification of the territory and the sovereignty of the Motherland."
Mao Zedong replied on 24 October 1951:
Your telegraph on October 24, 1951 has already been received. I thank you for your efforts to implement the agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet, and I would like to extend my heartfelt congratulations.
According to the Tibetan government-in-exile, some members of the Tibetan Cabinet (Kashag), for example, Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa, never accepted the agreement.: "In 1952, Lukhangwa told Chinese Representative Zhang Jingwu: 'It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been.'" But the National Assembly of Tibet, "while recognizing the extenuating circumstances under which the delegates had to sign the 'agreement', asked the government to accept the 'agreement'... the Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that it would radio its acceptance of the 'agreement'."
Repudiation of the agreement
As documented by the International Commission of Jurists, the legal grounds for Tibet's valid refutation were that multiple "undertakings had been violated" by China, those undertakings specifically included within the Seventeen-Point agreement.
On the same day in March 1959, Tibet also declared its independence from China during the 1959 Tibetan uprising, which was directly triggered on March 9 by a widespread concern for the Dalai Lama's safety,International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law. ICJ: Geneva, 1959, p.18 before he escaped from Lhasa and arrived in India on March 19. Later on June 20, a press conference was held in Mussoorie, India, where further statements were made International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law. ICJ: Geneva, 1959, p.19 concerning Tibet's legal revocation of the agreement.
The signing of the Seventeen-Point agreement is also contested as invalid in the Tibetan exile community, who charged that the Tibet delegates were forced to sign under duress and that the Chinese allegedly used forged Tibetan government seals. The exile community and their supporters continue to assert that the Tibetan representatives were not allowed to suggest any alterations and that the Chinese government did not allow the Tibetan representatives to communicate with Lhasa.
German legal scholar Eckart Klein considers the agreement invalid and as having been signed under duress.
According to Tibetologist Melvyn Goldstein, the agreement may still be valid even if signed under military threat by the Chinese, but not if the Tibetan negotiators did not have the powers to concede to the Chinese: