The 61st Infantry Division was an infantry division of the British Army, raised in 1939 as part of the expansion of the Territorial Army in response to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. The division was created as a duplicate of the 48th (South Midland) Infantry Division, and was assigned to home defence duties.
While the division was never deployed overseas, its headquarters staff was deployed to Norway and briefly fought in the Norwegian campaign. Afterwards, the division was deployed to Northern Ireland for almost three years as a result of rumours of a German intention to invade. In Northern Ireland, the division manned static defences, conducted internal security, and trained for future operations. Returning to England, the division participated in military exercises and was scheduled to join the 21st Army Group for the Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of German-occupied France. It lost this role in late 1943, and was assigned to train replacements for combat units. Throughout 1944, the division aided Overlord in various deception formats, while most of the men were posted to combat formations within 21st Army Group. In late 1945, the division was reorganised as a light division and was going to be deployed to the Far East to fight Imperial Japan. The move was cancelled following the Japanese surrender, and the division was disbanded in November 1945.
Background In the 1930s, tensions increased between Germany and the United Kingdom and its allies. During late 1937 and throughout 1938, German demands for the annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland led to an international crisis. In an attempt to avoid war, Britain's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler in September and brokered the Munich Agreement. The agreement averted immediate war and allowed Germany to annexe the Sudetenland. Chamberlain had intended the agreement to lead to the peaceful resolution of further issues, but relations between both countries continued to deteriorate. On 15 March 1939, Germany breached the terms of the agreement by invading and occupying the remaining provinces of Bohemia and Moravia.
In response, on 29 March, the British Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha announced plans to increase the Territorial Army (TA) from 130,000 men to 340,000 and in so doing double the number of TA divisions. The plan of action was for the existing units to recruit over their allowed establishments (aided by an increase in pay for Territorials, the removal of restrictions on promotion that had been a major hindrance to recruiting during the preceding years, the construction of better-quality barracks and an increase in suppertime rations) and then form second-line divisions from small cadres that could be built upon. As a result, the 61st Infantry Division was to be created as a second-line unit, a duplicate of the first-line 48th (South Midland) Infantry Division. In April, limited conscription was introduced. This involved 34,500 militiamen, all aged 20, who were conscripted into the regular army, initially to be trained for six months before being deployed to the forming second-line units. Despite the intention for the army to grow, the programme was complicated by a lack of central guidance on the expansion and duplication process and issues regarding the lack of facilities, equipment and instructors.
History Initial service It was envisioned that the duplicating process and recruiting the required numbers of men would take no more than six months. Some TA divisions had made little progress by the time the Second World War began; others were able to complete this work within a matter of weeks. By the outbreak of the war, the division was active, under the general officer commanding, Major-General Robert J. Collins, and was composed of the 182nd, 183rd, and 184th Infantry Brigades and supporting elements. Following the division's formation, it was assigned to Southern Command. At the end of November, Major-General Adrian Carton de Wiart took command. The division was spread out, ranging from Birmingham to Portsmouth, and Cheltenham to Reading, and with the headquarters in Oxford. On 15 April, Carton de Wiart, as well as the divisional staff, were deployed to Norway; Major-General Edmond Schreiber assumed command of the 61st Division, and was assigned a new divisional staff.
Headquarters deployed to Norway
In their opening assault upon Norway, German troops had seized Trondheim. In response, the British Army planned to launch a two-pronged pincer attack to retake the city. The troops to undertake this attack came from the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division (a first-line TA division), which had already been earmarked for service in Norway prior to the German invasion. The division was temporarily broken up, its brigades acting as individual commands. The 146th Infantry Brigade, which would make up the bulk of Mauriceforce and form the northern pincer began landing on 17 April. Due to time restraints and troops already assigned to the expedition, the 61st Division was not deployed to Norway. Instead, Carton de Wiart was given command of Mauriceforce and was allowed to select his staff, which he drew from his headquarters. The southern pincer, to the south and separated by mountainous terrain and rivers, was to be undertaken by Major-General Bernard Paget's Sickleforce that had landed at Åndalsnes.
Soon after arriving, the 146th Brigade's leading battalions began to move south. On 21 April, Carton de Wiart's troops engaged in the first encounter of the war between British and German troops. The British, largely confined to the road network and advancing in deep snow, were engaged by a slightly larger German force that was supported by artillery and air support. The Germans, utilizing sledges, motorcycles, and ski-troops were able to outmanoeuvre and force back the British. German follow-up attacks did not materialise, but the Luftwaffe heavily bombed the small port at Namsos. Carton de Wiart cabled the War Office and stated "with my lack of equipment I was quite incapable of advancing on Trondheim and could see very little point in remaining in that part of Norway sitting out like rabbits in the snow". The evacuation was not ordered until the end of the month and then completed in the early days of May, after the loss of 157 men of Mauriceforce. The lack of success in Norway, and the withdrawal of the forces attempting to retake Trondheim, resulted in the collapse of Chamberlain's Government. Carton de Wiart, considered a daring and aggressive commander, was – per historian Jack Adams – "hampered by ... climatic and geographic conditions" and his troops were "inexperienced, poorly prepared and badly backed up".
Deployment to Northern Ireland
As early as mid-May 1940, while the Battle of France was still being waged, the British Government began to fear that Germany would immediately launch an invasion of the British Isles. This fear was compounded by, as historian Paul McMahon commented, the "catastrophic Allied defeats" that soon followed, which produced "two hysterias in the summer of 1940: first, fear of imminent invasion and, second, a 'fifth column panic'." The initial fear of invasion was aroused by the alleged capture of German documents, by the Dutch, which contained plans for a German invasion as well as information regarding a simultaneous attack on Ireland by paratroopers who were to be assisted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This document, which no longer exists, caused panic within the British Government. The information was reinforced, in the following months, by reports warning of a German intent to invade Ireland from diplomatic missions and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). On 14 May, following his return to the United Kingdom, Carton de Wiart resumed command of the 61st Infantry Division; Schreiber had left the division two days previously, to take command of the 45th Infantry Division. After the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was evacuated from France, the British acted on the rumours of the German intent to invade Ireland, and the decision was made to reinforce the garrison (the 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division) by deploying the 61st Infantry Division; in the ensuing 12 months, the division would be followed by the 5th and 48th (South Midland) Divisions and the 71st and 72nd Independent Infantry Brigades).
McMahon commented that the SIS had a history of "furnish[ing] unreliable information on the IRA's foreign intrigues", but these past failures were ignored as the reports reinforced the fears of invasion. McMahon suggested that "It is even possible that the plans discovered in Holland were planted. Whether deliberate deception or not, British intelligence was well and truly deceived." Historian Eunan O'Halpin argued that while the Dutch document could be seen as a British fabrication, "it is now known ... that German deception operations prepared in anticipation of Operation 'Sealion' included the manufacturing of rumours and stories of plans to attack Ireland as a feint during the build up to an invasion of Southern England". Nicholas Mansergh commented that "Ireland had no place" in the initial Sealion plans, and it was not until 3 December 1940 that German planners even looked at the possibility before concluding that such an operation was not possible or if launched would result in failure. In his memoirs, Carton de Wiart commented "I can never believe the Germans had any intention of invading Ireland but I am very grateful for any reason which sent us there, for it was an ideal training ground for troops and the division improved enormously from the moment of our arrival."
The 61st moved to Northern Ireland, and came under the command of Northern Ireland District on 20 June. The division was responsible for manning the static defences across Northern Ireland and defending Belfast, as well as being responsible for the internal security of the country. While based across most of Northern Ireland, it was largely positioned within County Antrim, County Londonderry, and County Tyrone, with the divisional headquarters at Ballymena. The division trained to repel seaborne invasions from German forces, as well as airborne landings and small raids. The beaches of County Antrim and Londonderry were seen as the most likely areas for an invasion, and by the end of autumn, concrete pillars, barbed wire entanglements, and camouflaged firing positions had been constructed. During the division's stay in Northern Ireland, Lieutenant-General Henry Pownall took command of British forces in the country. His appointment resulted in Carton de Wiart losing command of the division on grounds of his age (one month shy of his 61st birthday). Carton de Wiart was replaced by Major-General Charles Fullbrook-Leggatt, who assumed command on 6 April 1941.
In June 1942, the division took part in the first major joint Anglo-American exercise with newly arrived U.S. Army troops. This exercise, a 10-day event codenamed Atlantic, saw U.S. V Corps (U.S. 1st Armored Division, the 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division, and the British 72nd Infantry Brigade) engage British Forces Northern Ireland (the U.S. 34th and the 61st Infantry). On 15 September, Major-General John Carpenter took command of the division, replacing Fullbrook-Leggatt.
Return to England, training, and Operation Overlord