The Martin Marietta SM-68A/HGM-25A Titan I was the United States' first multistage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in use from 1959 until 1962. Though the SM-68A was operational for only three years, it spawned numerous follow-on models that were a part of the U.S. arsenal and space launch capability. The Titan I was unique among the Titan models in that it used liquid oxygen and RP-1 as propellants; all subsequent versions used storable propellants instead.
Originally designed as a backup in case the U.S. Air Force's SM-65 Atlas missile development ran into problems, the Titan was ultimately beaten into service by Atlas. Deployment went ahead anyway to more rapidly increase the number of missiles on alert and because the Titan's missile silo basing was more survivable than Atlas.
The succeeding LGM-25C Titan II served in the U.S. nuclear deterrent until 1987 and had increased capacity and range in addition to the different propellants.
History By January 1955, the size of nuclear weapons had been shrinking dramatically, allowing the possibility of building a bomb that could be carried by a missile of reasonable size. The Titan I program began on the recommendation of the Scientific Advisory Committee.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. vi. The committee presented to the United States Air Force (USAF) their findings of the technical feasibility to develop weapons (bombs) and their delivery systems (intercontinental range ballistic missiles) that were completely invulnerable to "surprise" attack.
The reduction in the mass of nuclear warheads allowed full coverage of the entire Sino-Soviet land mass, and the missile control capabilities were also upgraded. The Titan I would be fully independent in controlled flight from launch to the ballistic release of the warhead, which would descend to its target by the combination of gravity and air resistance alone. In May 1955 the Air Materiel Command invited contractors to submit proposals and bids for the two stage Titan I ICBM, formally beginning the program. In September 1955, The Martin Company was declared the contractor for the Titan missile. In early October the Air Force's Western Development Division was ordered to start work.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. vi. The Titan was developed in parallel with the Atlas (SM-65/HGM-16) ICBM, serving as a backup with potentially greater capabilities and an incentive for the Atlas contractor to work harder.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 11. Martin was selected as the contractor due to its proposed organizationGreen, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 17. and method of igniting a liquid fueled engine at high altitude.Green, Warren E.. The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 17.
The Titan I was initially designated as a bomber aircraft (B-68), but was later designated SM-68 Titan and finally HGM-25A in 1962.
Program management The previous strategic missile programs of the Air Force had been administered using the "single prime contractor concept" (later called the weapon system concept).Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 3. This had resulted in three badly botched programs; the programs of the Snark, Navaho and RASCAL missiles had slipped an average of 5 years and had cost overruns of 300 per cent or more.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 4. In response, the Teapot Committee was tasked with evaluating requirements for ballistic missiles and methods of accelerating their development. As a result of the ensuing recommendations, the USAF established the Western Development Division and Brigadier General Bernard Schriever was detailed to command it. Schriever devised an entirely new organization for program management. The Air Force was to act as "prime contractor," the Ramo-Woolridge Corporation was contracted to provide systems engineering and technical direction of all ballistic missiles. The airframe contractor also would assemble the sub-systems provided by other Air Force contractors.Sheehan, Neil 2009, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon, New York: Vintage Books, 2009, pp. 233–234. At the time, this new organization was very controversial.Sheehan, Neil 2009, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon, New York: Vintage Books, 2009, pp. 255–257.
The Titan I represented an evolution of technology when compared to the Atlas missile program, but shared many of the Atlas' problems. The liquid oxygen oxidizer could not be stored for long periods of time, increasing the response time as the missile had to be raised out of its silo and loaded with oxidizer before a launch could occur. The main improvements of the Titan I over the first Atlas's deployed were vertical storage in a fully underground silo and an improved fully internal inertial guidance system. Later Atlas E/F models were equipped with what would have been the Titan I's guidance systemGreen, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 23. The Titan I would be deployed with the Bell Labs radio-inertial guidance system.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 24Spirres, David 2012, On Alert An Operational History of the United States Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Program, 1945-2011, Air Force Space Command, United States Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 2012, p. 97
Budgetary problems The Titan, proposed as a fallback in case the Atlas failed, was by December 1956 accepted by some as a "principal ingredient of the national ballistic missile force."Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 36. At the same time, others pushed for the cancellation of the Titan program almost from the beginning, arguing that it was redundant.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 37. Despite counterarguments that the Titan offered greater performance and growth potential than the Atlas as a missile and space launch vehicle, the Titan program was under constant budgetary pressure. In the summer of 1957 budget cuts led Secretary of Defense Wilson to reduce the Titan production rate from the proposed seven per month to two a month, which left the Titan as a research and development program only.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 41. However, the Sputnik crisis, which started 5 October 1957, ended any talk of canceling Titan. Priority was restored, and 1958 saw increases in funding and plans for additional Titan squadrons.Divine, Robert A., The Sputnik Challenge, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, , p. xv.
Flight testing The Titan I flight testing consisted of the first stage only Series I, the cancelled Series II, and Series III with the complete missile.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 91.
A total of 62 flight test missiles were constructed in various numbers. The first successful launch was on 5 February 1959 with Titan I A3, and the last test flight was on 29 January 1962 with Titan I M7. Of the missiles produced, 49 launched and two exploded: six A-types (four launched), seven B-types (two launched), six C-types (five launched), ten G-types (seven launched), 22 J-types (22 launched), four V-types (four launched), and seven M-types (seven launched). Missiles were tested and launched in Florida at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station from Launch Complexes LC15, LC16, LC19, and LC20.Cleary, Mark, The 6555th Missile and Space Launches Through 1970, 45th Space Wing History Office, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, Chapter III Section 6
The four A-type missile launches with dummy second stages all occurred in 1959 and were carried out on 6 February, 25 February, 3 April, and 4 May. The guidance system and stage separation all performed well, and aerodynamic drag was lower than anticipated. Titan I was the first program to have a new missile succeed on the initial attempt, which left launch crews unprepared for the series of failures that followed. Missile B-4 exploded from a LOX pump failure during a static firing at Martin's Denver test stand in May and assorted other mishaps occurred in the following two months.Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 93.
Missile B-5 was intended to launch from LC-19 as the first flight article Lot B missile, incorporating most Titan I missile systems but with a dummy warhead. A planned launch on July 31 was scrubbed due to fuel system problems. At about noon on August 5, B-5 was launched. The missile rose about ten feet before the engines shut down and it fell back onto LC-19 in a fiery explosion. Postflight investigation found that the hold-down bolts released prematurely, causing B-5 to lift before full thrust rise had been achieved. A still-attached umbilical sent a shutdown command to the engines. LC-19 was badly damaged and would not be used again for six months.
Further problems occurred over the next several months. Missiles continued to be damaged through careless personnel mistakes and General Osmond Ritland sent Martin an angry letter calling their handling of the Titan program "inexcusable." Ritland's disciplinary blast had little effect for the time being. On December 10, the first attempt was made to launch a Lot C missile, which would be a complete Titan I with all systems and a detachable warhead. Missile C-3 was prepared for launch but much like with B-5, a premature shutdown command was sent due to failure of an umbilical to detach, fortunately the missile had not been released from the pad. The umbilical was quickly repaired but any relief at having avoided near-disaster was short-lived.